Different networks have different structures. This paper proposes a network formation model that provides an explanation as to why some networks have high clustering coefficient and/or average path length while others don't. In the model, agents have their own multidimensional types. In the simplest model called cutoff-rule model, agents form links if they are close to each other in the type space. We consider, as opposed to the existing models in the literature, various notions of distances in the type space, and show that they result in various clustering coefficients and average path lengths of networks. We provide a microfoundation for the cutoff-rule model, and show that unique strongly stable network exists, and that it can always be constructed by the cutoff-rule model. This result implies that the results from the cutoff-rule model carry over to the microfounded model. Our model serves as a foundation for the "strength of weak ties hypothesis" of Granovetter (1973).
Introduction
Relevance of social networks in the context of economic interaction is more and more acknowledged recently.
1 Numerous works have discovered that different networks have different structures, where the structures of networks are evaluated using various measures. Three well-known and well-used measures of network structures are clustering coefficient, average path length, and degree distribution, which represent the cliquishness, connectedness, and heterogeneity (of the numbers of neighbors) in networks, respectively. This paper constraints attention to the former two measures, asking the following question: Why some networks have high clustering coefficient and/or average path length, while others don't? The model in this paper provides a possible answer for this question, which gives an economic insight about network structures. Also, we show that we can establish a model that does not contradict observed degree distributions in the data.
Recent studies in networks and economics have established a variety of models to answer this question. A standard assumption often used in the literature is that people are partitioned into several groups, and the relationships within a group cost less than the relationships across groups (See Jackson and Rogers (2005) and Galeotti, et al (2005) ). Their model explains so-called "small world" property in reality, namely, high clustering coefficient and low average path length. While their models assume that an agent belongs to exactly one group, in reality an agent belongs to multiple groups. For example, one might be a student of a graduate school in economics while he is also in a community in which they play soccer. Gilles and Johnson (2000) analyze a related model of network formation, in which links are formed based on the costs that depend on geographical distances between agents. But they consider only one dimensional spatial model and do not capture the multi-dimensional relationships among agents.
2
In modeling situations where agents have multiple aspects of characteristics, or where they belong to multiple groups, it is necessary for agents to have ways to integrate and evaluate the information about the relationships in different dimensions or groups. For example, is it the case that one can make friends with another when either the affiliations or the tastes matches? or is it the case that both the affiliations and tastes have to match? Furthermore, these dimensions themselves might be different across different societies. Some dimension, say religion, might matter a lot in some networks, but perhaps not in others. Also, it might be the case that the development of communication technology enables us to interact each other based on new types of interests, beyond geometric constraints.
In light of this motivation, the paper models agents' characteristics, or types, as points in a multi-dimensional type space, and analyzes how the network structure depends on the notion of distance on the type space. Each coordinate indicates some aspect of agents' characteristics, such as jobs, locations, tastes, and so forth. Distance in the type space, which we call social distance, represents the level or amount of obstacles to their relations, so agents form links with others who are nearby. 4 We consider a class of notions of distance, k'th norm, in which the distance between two points in the type space is the k'th smallest distance among m dimension-wise distances between them, where m denotes the number of dimensions of the type space.
5
We first introduce a network formation model based on benefit and cost of link formation. Our assumptions here are that the benefit of a link is decreasing in the distance between two agents involved, and the cost is increasing linearly with respect to degree. We show that, in a unique pairwise stable state, each agent can be interpreted as if she has her own cutoff on the distance to her neighbors, above which she does not have an incentive to form links. Based on the result, we then analyze cutoff-rule model, in which agents form links if the distance between them is no more than some exogenously given cutoff value. It is shown that the clustering coefficient and the average path length vary as we vary the value of k or m. We focus on the limit of the network as the number of nodes goes to infinity, with some technical conditions. We also show that any desired degree distribution can be obtained by varying the distribution of agents over the type space.
We also consider the case of nonlinear cost function. It will turn out that unique strong stable network always exists in our model, and it can be analyzed by the cutoff-rule model with some technical conditions. 6 Although in our model the heterogeneity of agents matter in terms of social distance between agents, there is another way to describe the heterogeneity. Fujii and Kamada (2009) introduce a network formation model in which each agent has his or her own intrinsic sociality, and two agents different characteristics, we abstract away from this possibility in this paper.
4 Akerlof (1997) uses the notion of social distance, too.
5 Tversky (1977) claims that when similarity relationships are formulated on a multiple dimensional space, they often violate triangle inequality. Note that our k'th norm with k < m does not satisfy triangle inequity. 6 The notion of strong stability is introduced in Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) .
form a link if the benefit from the link formation exceeds some (exogenously given) link-formation cost, where the benefit is nondecreasing in their socialities.
7 Their model and ours provide complementary approaches about network formations. Indeed, by introducing social distance in their model, or by introducing sociality in our model, we could easily have a more realistic formation model of social networks.
One of the related themes in the literature is "homophily" in networks.
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This theme is closely related to our paper since, in our model, social distance describes people's similarity relations. Although the literature on homophily focuses on similarity in terms of one dimension (e.g. ethnicity), our model deals with multiple dimensions. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce terminology of networks and the notion of social distance. In Section ??, we present a model of network formation based on benefit and cost of link formation. In this section, cost function is assumed to be linear with respect to degree. In Section 4, the main section, we analyze the cutoff-rule model. Clustering coefficients, average path length, and degree distribution are studied. In Section 5, we first discuss the case of nonlinear cost functions, to which the application of the cutoff-rule model is not straightforward. Then, we discuss several extensions of the cutoff-rule model, the relationship of our model with the "strength of weak ties hypothesis" proposed by Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( , 1995 , and the welfare analysis using the notion of "communication externality" introduced by Rosenblat and Mobius (2004) . Proofs are relegated to Appendix.
Definitions

Terminology
.., n} is a finite set of nodes (or, agents) . A network g is a set of links between agents in N . A link between agents i and j are denoted ij. We say ij ∈ g if and only if there exists a link between agents i and j. Let G(N ) denote the set of all the possible networks defined on the set of agents, N . We focus only on non-directed networks, hence require ij = ji. We suppose ii ∈ g for all i ∈ N by convention.
7 Their model is a special case of the model proposed by Caldarelli et al. (2002) . 8 Homophily is a well-observed socio-psychological tendency of people to interact with others similar to oneself. To address this issue, Currarini et al. (2007) use search theoretic network formation model and fit their model to the empirical data. Also, Jackson (2008b) formalizes a dynamic model that exhibits homophily and sees its implications on network structures. Agent i's neighbors are j's with ij ∈ g. Formally, the set of i's neighbors in g, denoted by N i (g), is defined as: N i (g) = {j ∈ N |ij ∈ g}. Agent i's degree, q i (g), is the number of i's neighbors, i.e. q i (g) = N i (g).
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A path between nodes i and j is a sequence of links (
Path length between i and j, P L ij (g), is the smallest length of the sequence that corresponds to a path between i and j. If there exists no path between i and j, then the path length between i and j is ∞ by convention. Average path length, AP L(g), is the average of P L ij (g)'s over all ij's that have finite path lengths.
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Clustering coefficient, Cl(g), is the average of the probability that a given node's two neighbors are connected to each other. This measure represents the cliquishness of a network. Formally, first define the clustering of agent i, Cl i (g), as follows:
if the denominator is nonzero, and Cl i (g) = 0 otherwise. The denominator in the above expression is
, the number of possible pairs between i's neighbors. The numerator is the number of links actually formed among such pairs. The clustering coefficient of a network g is given by Cl(g) = 1 n ∑ i∈N Cl i (g).
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We will sometimes suppress each measure's dependence on g, if there is no risk of confusion.
Type Space and Social Distances
Each agent is assumed to be located on a point in X = [0, 1] m , which we call type space. Every agent belongs to the type space: Denote by x i = (x i1 , ..., x im ) ∈ X the point, or type, associated with agent i ∈ N .
We assume that x i 's are independently and identically distributed according to a distribution with a continuous probability distribution function f
The convention is to denote a degree by d rather than q, but we reserve this notation for the later use when we deal with distances.
11 Thus, strictly speaking, AP L is defined only for nonempty networks, g = ∅.
12 There is another concept of clustering coefficient, overall clustering, that does not average over agents' clusterings but over pairs of neighbors:
Clustering coefficient in this paper gives more weight to the clusterings of low-degree nodes than does the overall clustering. The results in this paper do not hinge on the specific use of the concept of clustering coefficient. Precisely, both concepts give exactly the same set of results in our model. over X. To simplify the analysis, we will assume that f is the uniform distribution except in Subsection 4.4, where it turns out that any of our results doesn't rely on this assumption.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we will consider various notions of distance (or social distance in other words) in the type space X. Specifically, define a class of social distances, which we call k'th norm: Definition 1. For every pair of agents i and j in the type space, k'th norm, d (k) : X × X → R measures the distance between them as follows:
Note that this definition boils down to
if there is no tie in dimension-wise distances.
To grasp the intuition, for example, suppose two agents i and j are located on the type space X with m = 4. Their locations are x i = (0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6) and x j = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7). Then dimension-wise distances are (0.4, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1). If we use 1'st norm, then d
(1) (i, j) = 0.1; If we use 2'nd norm, then d (2) (i, j) = 0.3, and so forth.
Considering the situation where agents use social distances when they evaluate the values of relationships with others, the interpretation of the notion of k'th norm is that if k is large, agents care a lot of aspects of others' types, while if k is small, then they don't care a lot of aspects of other's types.
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We will occasionally restrict our attention to the following special cases, which correspond to k = m and k = 1, respectively:
We sometimes use the notation d(i, j), omitting "(k)," "max," or "min," if there is no risk of confusion.
The Model and Terminology
An agent's payoff is composed of benefit and cost from his neighbors,
where b(·) is a weakly decreasing function and is continuous from the left, and c(·) is a strictly increasing function. Interpretation is that b(d(i, j) ) denotes the benefit that i obtains from the link ij when the distance between i and j is d (i, j) , and c(q i ) denotes the cost that i pays to maintain his q i links. Let ∆c(q) = c(q +1)−c(q) denote the marginal cost of adding one more neighbor. Cost functions are assumed to be homogeneous across all the agents, and are either linear (i.e. ∆c(q) is constant), concave (i.e. ∆c(q) is decreasing), or convex (i.e. ∆c(q) is increasing).
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We introduce two notions that characterize classes of networks:
.
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Pairwise stability is the notion that is proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . In a pairwise stable network, no agent has an incentive to deviate from existing relationships, where the deviation can be made only by adding or deleting just one link that involves the deviating agent. We employ this concept to analyze the situation in which each link is formed based on the players' mutual agreement.
In this section, we consider how agents form links in a pairwise stable network. In particular, we introduce a class of simple decision rule, cutoff rule. Under this rule, they have their own cutoff social distances, above which they do not form links:
is also a cutoff value profile where > 0.
Linear Cost Functions
In general, a pairwise stable network may be neither unique nor efficient.
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Moreover, a cutoff value profile does not necessarily exist for a pairwise stable network, i.e it is not generated by cutoff-rule. 17 The next proposition states that with linear cost functions, a pairwise stable network can be generated from the cutoff-rule model with some homogeneous cutoff value, and that it is also unique and efficient. 
Proof Idea. The proof is constructive. As the marginal cost of any additional link formation is constant, in pairwise stable network, link ij exists if and only if b(d(i, j) ) is no less than that marginal cost. It is straightforward to see that this type of network is unique, and also that we can use the distance that equates the benefit and the marginal cost as a cutoff value. As the marginal cost is constant, this cutoff value should be homogeneous across agents. Efficiency is also straightforward from the assumption of constant marginal cost. See Appendix A.1 for the detail.
Thus, we can interpret the model with a linear cost function as if we interpret the model where the agents were using a homogeneous cutoff value. Furthermore, the resulting pairwise stable network is unique and efficient.
In the next section, we analyze the cutoff-rule model in detail where the number of agents goes to infinity and then the cutoff goes to zero. Propositioncharacterized by clustering coefficient and average path length. Furthermore, we show that any desired degree distribution can be obtained by adjusting the agents' distribution over the type space, without changing the results about clustering coefficient and average path length.
As we have shown in the previous section, the cutoff-rule model presented here can be interpreted as the model in which agents have benefit and cost functions as in (1). The simplicity of cutoff-rule model enables us to obtain results that is expositionally neat and (hence) appeal more to our intuition.
The Model
Each agent i is associated with her cutoff value, denoted byd i . The link between i and j is formed if and only if the distance between them is no more than both i's cutoff value and j's.
Except in Subsection ??, we assume that the cutoff values are common to all the agents. Let the common value bed. That is, ∀i ∈ N,d i =d.
Clustering Coefficient
In this subsection, we will analyze how the clustering coefficient depends on the property of the social distance in consideration. We focus on the expected clustering coefficient in the limit asd tends to zero and n tends to infinity. Formally, we consider the value of Cl
. Notice the order of the limit. If the order were reversed, this value would be trivially zero for any value of k. For, if we letd tend to zero with some fixed n, the set of i's neighbors eventually becomes empty for any i ∈ N with probability one. Recalling that i's clustering is zero when i has no more than two friends, we can conclude that limd →0+ E [Cl(g) 
We will sometimes use the notation Cl * (k, m) instead of Cl * , to make it clear that this value depends on the social distance in consideration.
We can solve for this limit clustering for every pair of k and m.
Proposition 2. For each m and k
Proof Idea. To understand the intuition, consider the case of m = 2 and k = 1. A typical agent i in the interior of the type space has three types of neighbors: those who are close to i only with respect to the first dimension, those of only second dimension, and those of both dimensions. As the cutoff goes to zero, the probabilities that agent j being the first, second, and third types, given that he is a neighbor of i, converge to 1/2, 1/2, and 0, respectively. But if j is the first (resp. second) type and is connected with some other i's neighbor k, the probability that k being also the first (resp. second) type approaches 1 as the cutoff goes to zero. The probability that the two first type neighbors being connected to each other is the probability that two points in a unit interval have a distance no more than 0.5, which is 3/4. Also, the probability that j and k are the same type converges to 1/2. Hence, in this case, the clustering coefficient converges to 1/2 · 3/4 = 3/8. See Appendix A.2 for the detail.
To understand the formula given in the above proposition, consider the extreme cases: Max norm and Min norm.
higher with Max norm than with Min norm.
The proof is straightforward from Proposition 2, and is relegated to Appendix A.2.
Under the condition that m < 9 holds, the clustering coefficient is higher if social distances are measured by Max norm (k = m) than by Min norm (k = 1). The intuition is that, under Max norm, triangle inequality provides upper bounds of the distances between i's neighbors. Therefore, i's neighbors are relatively closely located to each other. For Min norm, however, this is not the case because the triangle inequality is not satisfied: Being neighbors of a common agent does not provide an upper bound of their distance, so it is possible that i's neighbors are quite far away from each other.
The second corollary of Proposition 2 is the following comparative statics:
18 The second part states that, with fixed m, there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the clustering coefficient and k. Notice that the nondecreasing part and the increasing part are strict, except at a possible indifference at the minimum.
Average Path Length
In this subsection, we solve for the average path length for each k. As in the previous subsection, we focus on the limit of the value:
. Again, the order of the limit is important. If it were reversed, then it would not be well-defined, as AP L is defined as the average of finite path lengths, while as the cutoff goes to zero with a fixed number of agents, all the pairs of agents have distance ∞ with probability one. We also use AP L * (k, m) as before. The following proposition gives the formula of AP L * for k'th norm with k < m.
Proposition 3. Take any k and m such that
is not an integer and
Proof Idea. To understand the intuition, consider the case of m = 5 and k = 3, and suppose for a moment (only in this paragraph) that we are dealing with continuum of agents. With probability one, a pair of agents i and j satisfies 0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0. 3) and x j = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7). Letting x 1 = (0.7, 0.7, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3), x 2 = (0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.3), we construct a path: (x i x 1 , x 1 x 2 , x 2 x j ). In each link, the first 5 − 3 elements change from 0.3 to 0.7. This change ends in 5/(5 − 3) + 1 steps. The proof is a bit more involved since we deal with a finite number of agents. See Appendix A.3 for the detail.
To understand the proposition, consider the following corollary:
The proof is obvious from the formula given in Proposition 3, hence omitted. The average path length in a network, in the limit, tends to be short if the type space is rich (if m is large), and/or if agents don't care a lot of aspects of the others (if k is small).
The result is intuitive: If the number of dimensions at which agents must have similar characteristics in common to form a link is small relative to the richness of the type space, then each agent has neighbors who have many aspects of characteristics that are different from his ones. Thus, it is easy to have access to agents with very different characteristics through the network.
We summarize the results of Corollaries 2 and 3 in the graphs in Figures  ? and ? . In Figure ? , Cl * and AP L * are depicted for different values of m, for fixed k = 4. In Figure ? , on the other hand, they are depicted for different values of k, for fixed m = 7. Note that Cl * and AP L * change in the same direction when we vary the value of m. That is, when m increases, AP L * and Cl * decrease. The change with respect to k is not straightforward: Cl * is not monotonic in k. Proposition 3 rules out the case of Max norm, where k is exactly equal to m. The next proposition concerns this case.
Here, we see a striking difference between k'th norm with k < m and Max norm with k = m. With any k < m, the average path length takes some finite value in the limit as the cutoff goes to zero. But with k = m, the average path length goes to infinity. Furthermore, the argument in Proposition 4 applies also in the case of Euclid norm,
2 . Notice that triangle inequality is satisfied by Max norm (and Euclid norm), but not by k'th norm with k < m. Social distances with triangle inequality describe the situations where an agent's neighbors cannot be very far away from each other, which suggests that in such cases path lengths in network tend to be long.
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 constitute our main results in this paper: The structure of networks, measured by clustering coefficient and average path length, varies with the social distance in consideration. By exploiting the results in Corollaries 2 and 3, one can provide an interpretation for a variety of networks, and fit our model to the data by adjusting the parameters in the model, such as k and/or m.
Except for the case of Max norm, our model has the "small world" property, i.e. the networks have smaller average path length compared with lattice networks and larger clustering coefficient compared with randomly generated networks.
19 This is a well observed property in a variety of networks in reality and has been much studied in the literature. This property is generated in the existing literature by, for example, "rewiring" process (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) , hub nodes (Barabasi and Albert 1999) , or partition of agents as community structure. (Jackson and Rogers 2005) . Our model gives an alternative explanation for the "small world" property, which depends on the multi-dimensionality of the type space.
Degree Distribution
So far we have assumed that agents are uniformly distributed over the type space X. But a network generated by such a model has the degree distribution that converges in distribution to a degenerate point mass distribution, contradicting empirical evidences about degree distributions. 20 As mentioned earlier, however, our results don't rely on the assumption of uniform distribution. In this subsection, we state this statement formally, and further show that by appropriately changing the distribution over type space, we can have any desired degree distribution.
Proposition 5. For any f which has full-support over X and is continuous over X, Cl
* and AP L * in Propositions 2, 3, and 4 remain the same.
Proof Idea. If the distribution over the type space has full support over X and is continuous, we can show that f restricted tod-neighborhood of any agent is close to the uniform distribution asd → 0+. We can also show the continuity of clustering coefficient with respect to the distributions of nodes, which proves the proposition. See Appendix A.5 for the detail. Now, we know that the results we have got so far are robust to changes in distribution over X, as long as the distribution is continuous and has fullsupport over X. The next proposition shows that any degree distribution can be attained in the model. Before stating the result, we need a piece of notation:
In a random network in which the probability of link formation between any pair of nodes is p, then clustering coefficient is p. But if the network is large and the expected degree is moderate, p needs to be very small, which results in very low clustering coefficient.
20 See Barabasi (2002) , among others.
Thus, the relative degree of agent i is the ratio of his degree to the maximum of the degrees of all the agents. We introduce this concept because when we take the limit of n → ∞, the notion of degree, q i , does not work well since for all i, q i → ∞ as n → ∞. Again, we consider the limit of p i as n goes to infinity andd goes to zero: p * i = limd →0+ lim n→∞ p i . Note that the "law of large numbers"argument ensures that the limit exists.
The next proposition shows that any desired distribution of relative degrees can be obtained by appropriately changing the distribution over X.
Proposition 6. For any distribution of limit expected relative degrees, p
Proof Idea. The simplest way to construct an appropriate distribution over the type space is to deal with the marginal distribution over arbitrary chosen one dimension, while keeping the marginal distributions on other dimensions uniform. See Appendix A.6 for the detail.
Non-degenerate degree distributions are often found empirically. In particular, scale-free distribution have found extensively in the literature.
21 Although there have been proposed many models that explain these phenomena, Proposition 6 provides another explanation for them: An agent has high (resp. low) degree if he has many (resp. few) friends who have similar types to his one.
Discussions
Nonlinear Cost Functions
Nonlinear Cost Functions and Strong Stability
Generally, pairwise stability does not determine a unique network structure. Moreover, a pairwise stable network is not necessarily generated by cutoffrule. For example, consider the networks depicted in Figure 1 .
First, consider the decomposition of nodes in Figure 1 In this case, there are three types of pairwise stable networks, depicted in (a-1), (a-2) , and (a-3), respectively. The network in (a-1) is pairwise stable because the cost to form the first link, i.e. ∆c(0), is so high that no one wants to form a link. And, the network in (a-2) is pairwise stable because, again, the cost for the node 4 to form the first link is very high that he doesn't want to form a link even though the other three nodes have incentive to form a link with him. The network in (a-3) is also pairwise stable because the fact that the marginal cost of forming a third link, ∆c(2) is very low implies that the marginal benefit of deleting a third link is negative.
Next, consider the case of convex cost function. Consider the decomposition of nodes in Figure 1 (b) . There are four nodes, 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the type space X. 2) is not generated by cutoff rule. For, if it did, the cutoff value of node 1 has to be no less than 0.75 because it is connected to node 2 and d(1, 2) = 0.75. The cutoff value of node 3 has to be also no less than 0.7 because it is connected to node 4 and d(3, 4) = 0.7. But then, d(1, 3) = 0.4 < 0.75 implies that it has to be the case that the link 13 has to be formed, contradiction.
Although we have multiplicity of pairwise stable networks in both cases, the reason for the multiplicity is quite different. Precisely, in the case of convex cost functions, it is impossible that two networks g, g ∈ G(N ) are both pairwise stable and g g , while in the case of concave cost functions, it is possible as shown in the example in Figure 1 (a) .
Although multiple pairwise stable networks are possible, a refinement of the concept of pairwise stability, strong stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005) , can predict a smaller set of "stable" networks. By using this stronger notion of stability, we can show that the resulting network, which turns out to exist and to be unique, can be described by the cutoffrule model analyzed in Section 4.
Before defining strong stability, we need one more definition: We say a network g is obtainable from g via deviations by
That is, g is obtainable from g via deviations by S if each newly formed link in g involves the agents only from S, and each deleted link in g involves at least one agent from S. Definition 6. A network g is strongly stable if for any S ⊆ N and g that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, (∃i ∈ S s.t.
This concept requires that a stable network has to be robust to deviations by any coalitions. Note that if g is strongly stable, then it is also pairwise stable, as the coalition S can be any pair of agents.
The next proposition states that this refinement of stability concept selects a stable network, in which agents form networks as if they are using cutoff rule with possibly heterogeneous cutoff values. Suppose that agents are distributed uniformly over the type space, as in Section 4.
Proposition 7.
Suppose that the cost function is linear, convex, or concave. Then, there exists a strongly stable network g with probability one. Furthermore, g is generated by cutoff-rule.
Proof Idea. We propose an algorithm in which agents make offers to form links with others at each stage. The algorithm stops in a finite number of stages, and generates a strongly stable network. A cutoff value profile is given by the one in which each agent's cutoff is the maximum distance among his links with others in the generated network. See Appendix A.8 for the detail.
A pairwise stable network is not necessarily generated by cutoff-rule if it is not strongly stable. In the example in Figure 1 , for example, the network in (b-2) is pairwise stable, but is not strongly stable. So the fact that it is not generated by cutoff-rule is still consistent with the result in Proposition 7. Using the notion of strong stability, we can select a unique network in which players form links as if they are using some cutoff values. Note that, as opposed to the case of linear cost functions, cutoff value profile under nonlinear cost function is not necessarily homogeneous. An example is the network in Figure 1(a-2) , where agents 1-3 and agent 4 cannot have homogeneous cutoff value profile. Note that this network is not strongly stable, as the network in Figure 1(a-3) is obtainable from the network in Figure 1(a-2) via deviations by S = {1, 2, 3, 4} and all the agents would be better off through that deviations.
A homogeneous cutoff value profile may not exist even in a strongly stable networks: Consider the network in Figure 2 . Again, suppose that k = m = 2. Also, assume that b(d) = It is straightforward to see that there is a unique pairwise stable networks, namely, g = {12, 34} as seen in the figure. This is also strongly stable. Now, because node 1 is connected with node 2, his cutoff value, if any, has to be no less than 0.85. But because node 3 is not connected with node 1, his cutoff value, if any, has to be strictly less than 0.5. This implies that we can not find any homogeneous cutoff value profile. On the other hand, 0.85, 0.85, 0.35, 0.35) serves as a cutoff value profile. Hence, this example shows that even in a strongly stable network, cutoff value profile may not be homogeneous.
Next subsection examines how heterogeneous cutoff value profile can be, when the number of agents is very large.
Heterogeneous Cutoff Value Profile
In this subsection, we analyze how heterogeneous a cutoff value profile can be, when the number of agents is very large.
The following proposition shows that the heterogeneity of cutoff value profile is small when the marginal cost approaches some constant value as the number of agents goes to infinity. n , with probability that approaches one as n → ∞.
Proof Idea. For each agent, for sufficiently large number of nodes, there are sufficiently many neighbors in his δ-neighborhood. He has to be connected with them in a strongly stable network, for otherwise the network would not be pairwise stable, so it would not be strongly stable, either. This implies that he has a sufficiently large degree, and hence the cost function is almost linear when he decides whether or not to connect with agents outside the δ-neighborhood. Hence, he can be described as using a cutoff that is only slightly different from a fixed cutoff. See Appendix A.9 for the detail.
If the cost function approximates linear function as degree goes to infinity, then in the generated network the cutoff value profile is very close to homogeneous one when n is very large.
Next, we consider network formations under heterogeneous cutoff value profile. We assume that each agent has his own cutoff value,d i , and it is distributed in the interval [d − ,d + ] for some > 0, according to some (possibly unknown and/or correlated) distribution. That is, agents are using heterogeneous cutoff values, which deviate fromd by at most . Define
Note that the order of the limits implies that we consider the situation where the heterogeneity of the cutoff values is almost negligible relative to the values of the cutoff values themselves. The proof strategy runs parallel to that of Proposition 9, hence is omitted. Summing up, our main results are almost unchanged under the condition that heterogeneity of the cutoff values is almost negligible relative to the cutoff values themselves. Combined with Proposition 8, our results in Section 4 carry over even in the case of nonlinear cost functions provided that they approximate linear functions.
Information Diffusions and the "Strength of Weak
Ties Hypothesis" Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( ,1995 observes that "weak ties" bring more useful information than "strong ties", where the strength of the relationships is measured by frequency of interactions. He also discusses that strong ties typically tend to be informationally redundant because relationships tend to be transitive (e.g. a friend of one's friend is also his friend) in such a case. On the other hand, weak ties bring new information, since the relationships tend not to be transitive in such a case. In our model, link formations with k'th norm with small k is closely related to that of weak ties, because with small k, agents need not share many similarities to be connected with each other. Hence, our results are consistent with Granovetter's "strength of weak ties" hypothesis. Moreover, our results give a formal justification of the hypothesis. To see this a bit more formally, consider the following stylized model of information dissemination. At period 0 some agent i ∈ X obtains a piece of information, which has value δ T for j if j knows it at period T > 0, where 0 < δ < 1. At each period, each agent h talks (honestly) with his neighbor h ∈ N h (g) with probability p (D(h, h ) ), where D(h, h ) is the number of dimensions in which the dimension-wise distance is no more thand. We assume that p(·) is increasing, trying to capture the idea that if h and h have much in common, they communicate often.
22 Note that, for a pair of agents whose share approximates to one asd → 0, D is increasing in k. Thus we have that p is increasing in k. Note that D(h, h ) measures the "strength" of a link, in the sense of Granovetter (1973) , i.e. that the link hh is "strong" if h and h meet often, and it is weak if they meet infrequently. Now, the expected value of the information in the limit thatd goes to zero and n goes to infinity is simply δ AP L * , since if n is very large, with probability near 1 agent h can inform to some agent in any open subset of the set of points within distanced from h. Since we know that both p and AP L * is increasing in k, we can conclude that when the link is weak (i.e. D is low, so p is low), the information is more valuable (i.e. since k is low (suggested by low p), AP L * is low hence the value δ AP L * is high). Conversely, when the link is strong (i.e. D is high, so p is high), the information is less valuable (i.e. since k is high (suggested by high p), AP L * is high hence the value δ AP L * is low). Thus "the strength of weak ties" results.
Implication on Welfare: Communication Externality
In this subsection, we analyze the implication of our model on social welfare, relying on a procedure similar to the one in Rosenblat and Mobius (2004, hereafter RM) . Following RM, we define the communication externality in the society, denoted by CE(g), as follows:
The three terms represent the communication externalities that result indirectly from agents' link formations. Respectively, T (g) denotes the benefit of transmitted ideas from other agents, v(g) is the cost generated by difference in preferences of the agents, denoted by ∆E, and w(g) is the benefit of (informal) institutions serving the needs of specific groups. We explain each of the three terms below. Detailed discussion is available in RM.
Transmission of ideas. The term T (g) is the benefit of transmitted ideas from other agents. Some examples of these welfare-improving ideas are innovative technologies or information about job opportunities. Seminal empirical studies are Rogers (1995) and Granovetter (1995) , respectively. Then, following the discussion in the previous subsection, let us assume that T (g) is decreasing in AP L * .
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Corollary 3 tells us that AP L * is increasing in k and decreasing in m.
Hence we conclude that T (g) is decreasing in k and increasing in m.
Cost of differences. v(g) denotes the cost generated by difference in preferences of the agents, ∆E. The more diverse preferences for policies ("political type," hereafter) make collective decision making more difficult.
24 To think of ∆E, as in RM, we assume that agents' are partly influenced by the neighbor's preferences.
25 For simplicity, suppose that specific one of m axes of the type space, e.g. axis 1, describes the political type. Then, i's ex-post type in network g,x i1 (g), is assumed to be composed of his ex-ante type and their neighbors':x i1 (g) =
where β is a constant weight on the influence by the neighbors. Probability that i has a link to an agent j who has dissimilar political type, i.e.
ignoring the boundary problem. In the same way, probability that i has a link to agent j who has similar political type, i.e. |x i1 − x j1 | ≤d is,
23 RM assume T (g) to be inversely proportional to the degree of individual separation, which is defined in their model. As they notice, the degree of individual separation is closely related to average path length of the network.
24 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that the heterogeneity of preferences can reduce the provision of public goods in a community. Alesina and la Ferrara (2000) explain that social capital is lower in more heterogeneous communities.
25 Our formulation of ∆E and I(g) is somewhat different from the one in RM. In the model of RM, agents are partitioned into two groups, although in this paper the notion of group is not introduced explicitly.
Dividing the former by the latter, we obtain the ratio describing how often agent i has a link to an agent with dissimilar political type relative to the one with similar preference. Under the cutoff model, we can conclude that the larger this ratio is, the "more uniform" agents' political types become, in the sense that if agents i and j have a link, the probability that their political preference is similar is high. It turns out that, whend is sufficiently small, as in the cutoff model, this ratio is decreasing in k and decreasing in m.
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That is, their types get less diverse if the type space is rich (if m is large), and/or if the agents don't care a lot of aspects of the others (if k is small). Under these circumstances, a network tends to avoid the cost of the agents' differences.
Informal institution. Finally, w(g) describes the benefits of (informal) institutions. As classical works such as Jacobs (1961) and Coleman (1988) observe, a community with high network closure, i.e. Cl, can well support cooperative behaviors. That is, in such a network the neighbors can monitor each other and avoid 'free riders' by their 'community enforcement'. From another perspective, Chwe (2000) shows that a network with high Cl facilitate the collective action.
27 Hence, we assume that w(g) is decreasing in Cl.
By decomposing the communication externality as above, we can obtain insights on the welfare effect by changes in the type space. For example, suppose the type space becomes rich, i.e. m is increased with k being constant, because of the advance in communication technology or because the invention of a new interest group. We can predict three possible external effects on the welfare: First, since this implies smaller AP L, we predict a positive effect from transmissions of ideas through the network (higher T (g)). Second, as we have seen larger m facilitates mutual influences, leading their political preferences less diverse. Hence, the cost for producing public goods and/or enhancing social capital may be small, improving the social welfare (smaller v(g) ). Third, we predict that the network has smaller Cl, as we have 26 Note that we need to know only the direction of change of this ratio according to the changes of k and m. To simplify the calculation, we multiply the latter expression by 1−2d 2d
, and transform both formulas into exponential forms. Then, it turns out that we only need to see how
m−k changes with respect to k and m. Then we can confirm that this value is smaller than
seen in Corollary 3. This makes collective actions of the community harder, so the benefit from informal institutions becomes small (smaller w(g)).
Summing up, effects on communication externalities according to changes in the type space, i.e. k and m, is not straightforward: This depends on relative importance of each component, that is, benefits of transmitted ideas, costs generated by difference in preferences and benefits of (informal) institutions.
An Extension of Cutoff-Rule Models to Stochastic Models
In this subsection, we present models that include stochastic components in the cutoff-rule model. The results in this subsection applies to the cases of k'th norms with any k. We propose two ways to include stochastic components. We obtain similar results for both cases, but the two models highlights different aspects of possible "randomness" in agents' relationships.
First, suppose that each pair of agents i and j use a common cutoff value, d+ w ij , where > 0 is a fixed constant and w ij is an independently and identically distributed random term. Random terms are interpreted as caused by some mistakes or chance events. We assume that the distribution has a full-support over [0, 1] . This model differs from the previous deterministic models in that we now allow each agent to use various cutoff values. Let the expected average path length of this model be AP L s1 and the expected clustering coefficient be Cl s1 . The following propositions show that AP L s1 converges to 2, while Cl s1 converges to Cl s1 with = 0, as tends to zero. Second, suppose that each agent has the cutoff value ofd > 0 with probability 1 − , and that of D with probability , where D is a random variable whose distribution has a full-support on [0, 1]. The interpretation is that people who have different cutoffs are "crazy," while the remaining 1− people are "normal." Assume also that Pr(D = 0) = 0. This model differs from the deterministic model in that agents can differ in their characteristics (cutoffs, in this case) other than their types. Let the expected average path length of this model be AP L s2 and the expected clustering coefficient be Cl s2 . The following propositions are in line with the last two propositions, except that here the limit average path length is 3 rather than 2.
First proposition shows that AP L is very small in these stochastic models.
Proof. Part (i):
Fix the cutoffd > 0. Consider two points in X, and hypothetical agents i and j who are situated at these points. The probability that i and at least one of the j's neighbors are connected tends to 1 as n goes to infinity. Take such an agent and call him agent h. Now, agents i and h are connected, and agents h and j are connected. Thus, the path length between i and j is 2 with probability that tends to one. Since this argument holds for all pairs of points in X, we are done.
Part (ii): Fix the deterministic part of the cutoffd > 0. Consider two points in X, and let i and j be hypothetical agents who are situated at these two points. Let their cutoffs bed i andd j . Note that the distance between these points is strictly less than 1 with probability one. By the assumption of the model, they are positive with probability one. Now, for any δ , the probability that i has at least one neighbor h with
for every k and the cutoff being more than d(i, j) becomes above 1 − δ for sufficiently large n, where d denotes the notion of distance in consideration. Similarly, for any δ , the probability that j has at least one neighbor h with
) for every k and the cutoff being more than d(i, j) becomes above 1 − δ for sufficiently large n. Note that d(h, h ) < d(i, j)
holds. Now, agents i and h are connected, agents h and h are connected, agents h and j are connected. Thus, the path length between i and j is 3 with probability that tends to one. This completes the proof.
Proposition 4 tells us that the average path length with Max norm is very high. However, according to Proposition 11, the existence of stochastic components in the model leads to networks that have surprisingly low AP L, regardless of the property of social distance.
The next proposition tells us that the prediction about the clustering coefficient is not affected by the introduction of slight stochastic components.
Proposition 12. (i) Cl
s1 is continuous in at = 0; (ii) Cl s2 is continuous in at = 0.
Proof. Part (i): Take any δ > 0. Then, there exists > 0 such that the probability that agent i's cutoff is contained in (
Note that the chosen tends to zero as δ tends to zero. Thus, Cl s1 is a convex combination of clustering coefficients among agents who have cutoffs in (d − δ,d + δ) and some value in [0, 1], with the weight 1 − δ being placed on the former and the weight δ on the latter, where δ > 0 is a constant that tends to zero as δ tends to zero. But we know from the proof of Proposition 9 that the former converges to the clustering coefficient with = 0 as δ goes to zero. (although the proof concerns the limit of clustering coefficient as the cutoff goes to zero, the proof can be applied to clustering coefficient with any fixed cutoff values). Thus, by taking arbitrary small , δ goes to zero, and so the convex combination tends to the one with = 0. This completes the proof.
Part (ii): Cl s2 is a convex combination of clustering coefficients among agents who have the cutoff ofd and some value in [0, 1], with the weight 1−δ being placed on the former and the weight δ on the latter, where δ > 0 is a constant that tends to zero as tends to zero. But the former is exactly Cl s2 with = 0. Thus, by taking arbitrary small , δ goes to zero, and so the convex combination tends to the one with = 0. This completes the proof.
Although the models with k'th norm turn out to have so-called small world property, i.e. high clustering and low average path length, the model with Max norm doesn't. But the model with stochastic components exhibits small world property. The reason that we can recover this property is similar to the one in Watts and Strogatz(1998) . They construct a model where with small probability, randomly chosen links in a lattice network are deleted to make another link to some randomly chosen node (i.e. the links are "rewired"). The resulting networks turn out to have small-world property. By interpreting the network generated by our deterministic part of the model as a lattice network in Watts and Strogatz model, our introduction of stochastic components has the same spirit as their "rewiring" process. g is pairwise stable if and only if (i) there is no link ij ∈ g such that u i (g) < u i (g − ij) and (ii) there is no link ij ∈ g such that u i (g) ≤ u i (g + ij). Now, since ∆c(q) = c 1 for all q, (i) is equivalent to saying that there is no ij ∈ g such that b (d(i, j) ) < c 1 , and (ii) is equivalent to saying that there is no
≤d} is pairwise stable. Thus, pairwise stable network exists.
♦Uniqueness of the Pairwise Stable Network♦ Suppose that there are two distinct pairwise stable networks, g and g . Without loss of generality, there exists a pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g and ij ∈ g . But ij ∈ g and (i) in the existence part of this proof imply b (d(i, j) ) ≥ c 1 , while ij ∈ g and (ii) in the existence part of this proof
♦Existence of a Cutoff Value Profile♦ As is clear from the existence part of this proof, for all i and j with d(i, j) ≤d, they have (at least weak) incentive to form a link ij, and for all i and j with d(i, j) >d, they have no incentive to form a link ij. Hence, by settingd i =d for all i ∈ N , the profile ofd i 's serves as cutoff value profile, and it satisfiesd i =d =d j for all i, j ∈ N .
♦Efficiency of the Pairwise Stable Network♦ Suppose, to the contrary, i.e. that the pairwise stable network, g, is not efficient. That is, suppose that there is another network g = g in which the sum of utilities of all the agents is larger in g than in g (This comes from the assumption that the set of agents, N , is finite, so there is only finite number of possible networks on N , hence there has to exist a maximizer of the sum of utilities). Let
That is, g is obtained from g by deleting all the links in L 1 and adding all the links in L 2 . Note that the order of deletion and addition of links doesn't matter for the efficiency from the resulting networks by the definition of efficient networks. Now, for all ij ∈ L 1 , we have b(d(i, j) ) ≥ c 1 from the existence part of this proof, so the sum of utilities decreases by deletion of links in L 1 unless L 1 consists only of links ij such that d(i, j) = c 1 . Next, for all ij ∈ L 2 , we have b (d(i, j) ) < c 1 from the existence part of this proof, so the sum of utilities decreases by addition of links in L 2 if L 2 is not empty, and stays constant if it is empty. Hence, the only way that g be efficient is that L 1 's only elements are the links ij such that d(i, j) = c 1 , and L 2 is empty. But as deleting the links ij such that d(i, j) = c 1 doesn't change the utility of either i or j and hence it doesn't change the sum of utilities, g has the same sum of utilities as g even if it is efficient. In that case, g is also efficient by the definition of efficient networks, completing the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and its corollaries
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let the set of points sufficiently away from the boundary be We will ignore the possibility of the tie in distances, as it occurs with probability zero, hence doesn't affect in the calculation of the clustering coefficient. Also, we will prove for the case of continuum of agents. The proof has a straightforward extension to the case of finitely many agents, but since it would be very cumbersome, we will omit it, Note that the continuum assumption is consistent with the order of taking limits: First we let n go to infinity, and then we letd go to zero. Now, let B k d (x) be thed-neighborhood of point x under k'th norm. The limit clustering, Cl * , is the average of the limit clusterings of agent i's, denoted Cl * i . Cl * i is the probability that randomly chosen (according to the uniform distribution) two nodes are within the distance ofd.
For
(x) such that its element is close to x under the dimensions in which y is close to x. Note that the probability that randomly chosen (y, x,d, k) goes to zero asd goes to zero. Note also that, with the probability that approaches one, the projection of χ (y, x,d, k) on the restricted space with dimensions j's such that x j −d ≤ y j ≤ x j +d holds is a k-dimensional hypercube, with the center x 1 and sides 2d.
Hence, Cl * i the limit (asd goes to zero) of the product of (a) the probability that randomly chosen two points y and z in k-dimensional hypercube with sides 2d are situated within the distance ofd and (b) the probability that χ (y, x,d, k) = χ(z, x,d, k) holds. Now, (a) is equal to
and (b) is equal to Figure 3 for an illustration of (a) in 2-dimensional case, where the hypercubes are squares with sides 2d. In Figure 3 , 1 and 2 have a link because the square with the center x 1 and the square with x 2 intersect. The probability in (a) is the ratio of the intersection to the square. Now, note that both (a) and (b) , completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Part 1 is obvious from the formula in Proposition 1. We consider Part 2. From the formula in Proposition 1,
Taking logs, we get log Cl
) . Hence,
, completing the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
Take two points in X, x and y. With probability one, d min (x, y) > 0. Hence we restrict attention to the case of d min (x, y) > 0, as the event with zero probability doesn't affect the calculation of AP L (Recall that P L takes infinite value only if two nodes are not connected, but the AP L takes the average only over P L's with connected nodes). Now, fixd > 0 at a value whered < 1 2 d min (x, y). Consider a class of sets such that
is not an integer and m m−k − 1 if it is. Now, as n goes to infinity, the probability that there is at least one agent in β(t) goes to one for any t. Thus, with the probability that approaches one, there exists a path between x and y whose length is no more than Finally, we show that the path length cannot be less than this value, with probability one. To see this, suppose to the contrary, i.e. that there exists a path with length less than the value above that connects x and y. But such path has to have a link ww on it such that d(w, w ) >d. Contradiction.
Hence, we know that AP L * is exactly
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Take any pair of points in X, x 1 and x 2 . Consider a pair of hypothetical nodes, i and j, with the positions x i = x 1 and x j = x 2 . Let |x i1 − x j1 | > 0 without loss of generality (This comes from the assumption that we have some probability density function f over X). Write this value as a > 0. Then, with cutoffd > 0, the path length between i and j is bounded below by a/d. Asd > 0 goes to zero, this bound goes to infinity. Since this argument holds for all the pairs x 1 and x 2 with x 1 = x 2 , the proof is completed.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Fix k. Take any distribution of nodes, f , which has full-support pdf over X and is continuous. Consider a point in X and a hypothetical agent i who is situated at that point. Denote his position by x i . Note that f (x i ) is strictly positive.
Consider a distribution generated by f over the restricted set β δ (
Denote by h the pdf of this distribution. By definition, we have:
We will show that h can be arbitrarily close to the uniform distribution as goes to zero. Now, the continuity of f implies that for all small > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for all x such that d (k) (x i , x) < δ, it must be the case that |f (x i ) − f (x)| < holds. Hence, we have:
But both bounds approaches the same limit, proving the claim. Now, note that the clustering coefficient is continuous in the distribution of nodes. Also, note that the proofs about AP L * don't rely on the specific assumption about f , as long as it has full-support over X. Combining this claim and the above claim, we know that we can approximate a clustering coefficient and an average path length with a general distribution by the clustering coefficient and the average path length with the uniform distribution.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We will consider only the case of Max norm. Extensions to other cases are straightforward, but involve more cumbersome calculations, hence omitted. Also, we suppose that there is continuum of agents in this proof. This supposition is innocuous in proving this proposition. More rigid proof for the cases of finite number of agents is again straightforward, but involve more cumbersome calculations, hence omitted.
Denote by G(·) the desired distribution of p * i . We will construct a distribution over X that generates this distribution. Also, denote by F l (·) the marginal distribution over type space X onto l'th dimension.
For a union of disjoint intervals A = [a 0 , a 1 ), · · · , [a n−2 , a n−1 ), [a n−1 , a n ], let normalized point of an element a be
where Im(·) denotes the image of a function. It is straightforward to see that this construction gives rise to the desired distribution of relative degrees.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 9
The procedure is almost the same as the Proof for Proposition 1. We only need to modify the expression in the proof of Proposition 1:
to take into account the heterogeneity of the cutoff values. The expression has lower bound when the node in consideration has the cutoff ofd + , where all the other nodes have the cutoffsd − :
Also, it has an upper bound when the node in consideration has the cutoff ofd − , where all the other nodes have the cutoffsd + :
For anyd > 0, both bounds converges to the same limit, Cl * , as goes to zero. This completes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Fix the types (x 1 , ..., x n ). We ignore the possibility that there exist h, i) , because such events occur with probability zero. This implies that
We consider the following algorithm that generates a network. We will show in the sequel that the generated network is strongly stable.
Algorithm step 1
Each player i ∈ N (1) := N proposes a request
Generate a network g := {ij|j ∈ r i (1) and i ∈ r j (1)} ∈ G(N ).
Continue this procedure until the generated networkĝ satisfies the property that each link ij satisfies u i (ĝ − ij) ≤ u i (ĝ). As a result, we get g(1).
Delete links in the same way as above. Let g(t) be the resulting network.
Lett be the first period such that i ∈ N (t + 1) implies r i (t + 1) = ∅.
At each step t, the computation of the agents' requests are based on (myopic) "optimizations" at step t. That is, agent i proposes r i (t) to maximize the utility u i (·) from a network g(t − 1) plus links he requests at step t, assuming that all his requests will be accepted. Also, we delete links which at least one agent "has an incentive to delete." This event may occur when not all agents' requests are fulfilled. But there is no deletion of links in the algorithm when c is convex.
28 Hence, we can confirm that links that were not deleted in step t are not deleted in t > t.
29
For each step t, N (t) represents "remaining agents" at step t. Agent i with r i (t) = ∅ is interpreted as "leaving the room at step t because his demand has been satisfied." In this case, even if we add i to N (t ) where t < t , r i (t ) = ∅ holds. To confirm this, note that optimization of i at step t and step t have the same objective function, while the set of alternatives to choose at step t is smaller than that at step t. So, r i (t) = ∅ ⇒ r i (t ) = ∅ holds. Also, we do not delete i's links in the algorithm after step t, because i's utility keeps unchanged henceforth.
By the construction, g(t) is pairwise stable. That is, no agent has an incentive to delete a link, and no pair has an incentive to add a link. To confirm the condition for no deleting, note that we have constructed the network such that there is no link to delete at the last step. Moreover, for agents who have left in earlier steps, deleting their links do not increase their utilities, as confirmed in the previous paragraph. The condition for no adding is ensured in the same way. Agent at the last step does not have an incentive to add a link. And, neither agent who has left earlier does.
Since there is no tie in distances, for each t, ∀i ∈ N, r i (t) is uniquely determined. Therefore the algorithm generates a unique network. Before confirming that the algorithm ends in finite steps, we see the following property.
Lemma 1. For every
Proof. Note that with r i (t), i maximizes the sum of additional benefit minus additional cost. Separability of u and the definition of r i imply r i (t) = arg max
28 By the optimization, at any step t, j b(d(i, j) ) < ∆c(q i (g(t − 1)) + s) holds for some i,j, s ≤ r i (t ). But, the fact that ij was not deleted at step t implies b (d(i, j) ) > ∆c(q i (g(t))). Hence, this is a contradiction, because ∆c is nonincreasing.
Suppose, to the contrary, i.e. that ∃i ∈ N (t) s.t. ∃k ∈ r i (t) and ∃l ∈ N (t)\r i (t), d (i, k) > d(i, l) . Then, depriving r i (t) of k and adding l to r i (t) increases i's additional benefit (the first term of RHS) with i's additional cost (the second term of RHS) unchanged. This contradictions the maximization problem. Thus the statement is proved.
That is, i's request is a set of the agents who are closer to i than anyone who is not included in the request.
Lemma 2. The algorithm ends in finite steps.
Proof. The process of the algorithm can be considered as a deterministic dynamical system over discrete time t = 1, 2, · · · , defined on state space G(N ) × 2 N . The state at t = 2, 3, · · · is (g(t − 1), N (t)), and the initial state at t = 1 is (∅, N ). Note that the whole number of states is finite. Since links in g(t − 1) are not deleted at later steps, the process is irreversible. Therefore, it suffices to show that there does not exists an event where the process remains in the same state. This happens if any of agents' request is not fulfilled in the step, while none of agents leaves the room. Such an event is formally represented by Consider general case, where n denotes N (t). Permuting the indexes of the agents, there exists a sequence of agents (1, 2, · · · n) satisfying 2 ∈ r 1 (t), 3 ∈ r 2 (t), · · · , n ∈ r n−1 (t), 1 ∈ r n (t), and 1 ∈ r 2 (t), 2 ∈ r 3 (t), · · · , n − 1 ∈ r n (t), n ∈ r 1 (t). By Lemma 1, its contradiction is confirmed by a sequence d(1, 2) < d(1, n), d(2, 3) < d(2, 1), · · · , d(n − 1, n) < d(n − 1, n − 2), d(n, 1) < d(n, n − 1). So, we have proved that the algorithm stops in finite steps.
For the convex case, r i (t) has the following property.
Lemma 3. Suppose c is convex. If j ∈ r i (t),
then ∀t > t s.t. i, j ∈ N (t ), j ∈ r i (t ) or ij ∈ g(t ) holds.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, i.e. at some t > t s.t. j ∈ N (t ), i, j ∈ r i (t) and ij ∈ g(t ) hold. j ∈ r i (t) implies that ∑ j∈r i (t) b(d(i, j) ∆c(q i (g(t − 1)) + s). This is reduced to b (d(i, j) ) > ∆c(q i (g(t − 1)) + r i (t) − 1). Note that ∆c(q) is increasing in q, by the convexity of c. Then, b(d(i, j) ) > ∆c(q i (g(t − 1)) + s) holds for 0 ≤ s ≤ r i (t) − 1. i's degree doesn't exceed q i (g(t − 1)) + r i (t) when ij is not formed. Because, it requires i to form links at least two agents who are not included in r i (t) contracting that he does not have incentive to form another link when his degree is q i (g(t − 1)) + r i (t), i.e ∀k ∈ N (t)\r i (t) , b(d(i, j) ) < ∆c(q i (g(t − 1)) + r i (t)). So ∀t s.t. j ∈ N (t ), q i (t ) < q i (g(t − 1)) + r i (t) holds. Hence, i's incentive to form ij implies j ∈ r i (t ). This contradicts [j ∈ r i (t )∧ij ∈ g(t )], so the statement is proved. > b(d(i, k) ).
Consider the case where c is convex. By the construction of the algorithm, r j (t ) = ∅ at some t . Then, i ∈ N (t ) holds, otherwise r j (t ) must include i. Hence, r i (t ) = ∅ for t < t . Since k ∈ r i (t ) for some t < t < t , by Lemma 1, j ∈ r i (t ) holds. From Lemma 3, we have j ∈ r i (t) for any t > t such that j ∈ N (t). This implies j ∈ r i (t ), contradicting r i (t ) = ∅.
Therefore, for c that is either concave, convex, or linear, the statement is proved.
(The second part) Assume, to the contrary, i.e. that d (i, j) < d(j, l) holds. Consider the case case in which c is linear or concave. From the first part, u j (g + ij) < u j (g), it holds that b (d(i, j) ) < ∆c(q j (g)). Since g is pairwise stable, u j (g − jl) < u j (g), so that b(d(j, l) ) > ∆c(q j (g) − 1) holds. Then we have b(d(i, j) ) > b(d(j, l) ). But this implies ∆c(q j (g) − 1) < ∆c(q j (g)). This contradicts because ∆c(q) is non-increasing.
Consider the case of convex c. From ik ∈ g, at some t , k ∈ r i (t ) holds. Similarly, by jl ∈ g, at some t , l ∈ r j (t ) holds. Note that t = t contradicts, since ij ∈ g is implied through Lemma 2.
Think of the case t < t . We have j ∈ r i (t ) and i ∈ r j (t ) by Lemma 1. By Lemma 3, j ∈ r i (t) holds for any t > t such that j ∈ N (t). Then, we have j ∈ r i (t ). But this and i ∈ r j (t ) lead ij ∈ g, contradicting. The case of t < t is proved in the symmetric way.
Hence, the statement is proved.
♦existence of a profile of cutoff strategies♦
We claim that ♦existence of a strongly stable network♦ We show that g = g(t) is a strongly stable network, implying the existence.
Take g that is obtainable from g via deviations by S ⊆ N . Without loss of generality, denote S = (s 1 , ..., s r ). In order to prove the existence of strongly stable network, we want to show that
Note that ∀i ∈ S, u i (g) = u i (g ) holds, since there is no tie in distances. So, we show there exists a contradiction in order to satisfy ∀s i ∈ S, u s i (g ) > u s i (g).
In the deviation from g to g , the agent s 1 has to make additional links to some agents who belong to S. Suppose, without loss of generality, that s 1 s 2 is newly added. There exist two cases concerning s 1 's links. 
